that the data instead show there is a high probability that the rebate stimulated consumption. Moreover, the hypothesis that a rebate has half the impact of ordinary disposable income cannot be rejected. Thus, we find that analysis of the BEA aggregate time series data is consistent with the conclusion from the micro-data studies that the 2008 rebate stimulated consumer spending.
Bureau of Economic Analysis' (BEA) National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) aggregate time series data and concluded that the rebate failed. In this paper we reexamine their analysis of the BEA data.
In February 2008 Congress enacted an economic stimulus package that included a tax rebate for households. The U.S. Treasury mailed checks to households mainly in May, June, and July. Most single individuals received $300 plus $300 per dependent child while most married couples received $600 plus $300 per dependent child. For example, a family of two parents and three children received $1,500. The rebate amount phased in for low-income households and phased out for high-income households.
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The Taylor/Feldstein conclusions from the BEA aggregate data about the 2008 rebate contrast with two studies that use individual household micro data to study impact of the 2008 rebate (Parker, Souleles, Johnson, and McClelland, 2010; Sahm, Shapiro, and Slemrod, 2009 ). Both studies conclude that the rebate had a significant effect on the spending of a typical household receiving the rebate. "Using special questions added to the Consumer Expenditure Survey, we measure the response of household spending to the economic stimulus payments (ESPs) disbursed in mid-2008. We find that, on average, households spent 12-31% of their stimulus payments on non-durable goods during the three-month period in which the payments were received. Further, there was also a substantial and significant increase in spending on durable goods, in particular autos. Improving on previous research, these spending responses are estimated with precision using only variation in the timing of ESP receipt." 1 Although called a "tax rebate," the payment was technically a credit for tax year 2008 and the phase in and phase out were based on reported income for tax year 2007.
Their conclusion for the 2008 rebate is similar to the conclusion from their AER article Souleles, 2006, p1589) "In summary, the survey results suggest that roughly one-third of the rebate income was spent in 2008 and that the spending response was concentrated in the first few months after receipt."
Their result is consistent with what they found in their study a few months earlier ) in which they asked households what they intended to "mostly do" with their 2008 rebate. Based on the answers about intent, Shapiro and Slemrod estimated that the typical rebate recipient intended to spend about one-third of the rebate in the near future.
In summary, according to the micro data studies of the 2008 rebate the typical rebate recipient spent between one-third and two-thirds of the rebate within a half year of receiving the rebate.
In this paper we re-examine the BEA aggregate time series data used by Feldstein and Taylor. We consider two alternative hypotheses: (1) the Taylor/Feldstein hypothesis that the rebate had little or no effect (2) the hypothesis that the rebate had half the effect of ordinary disposable income.
After analyzing the same data used by Feldstein and Taylor, we come to these conclusions. First, we do not go to the other extreme and claim that the data show that the rebate definitely worked. We find that the data do not show that the rebate failed and instead show there is a high probability that the true rebate coefficient is positive.
Moreover, the hypothesis that the rebate has half the impact of ordinary disposable income cannot be rejected. Thus, we find that analysis of the BEA aggregate time series data is consistent with the conclusion from the micro-data studies that the 2008 rebate stimulated consumer spending.
The Op Ed Columns of Feldstein and Taylor
In their AER articles, Feldstein and Taylor each refer to their op ed articles in the Wall Street Journal on the impact of the 2008 rebate. In this section we review their op ed articles.
Before discussing Feldstein and Taylor, it is useful to state our own hypothesis about how a rebate works. In our view, when households receive a tax rebate they deposit the additional cash and their saving initially increases by the amount of the rebate. Gradually, the household spends more than it otherwise would have. Thus, immediately after a household receives a rebate check, we expect a spike in saving, but not a spike in spending, relative to what it would have been without the rebate. The key issue is the time path of consumption spending following receipt of the rebate compared to what it would have been-in particular, the spending differential over the year following the receipt of the rebate.
We accept the view associated with the permanent-income or life-cycle hypothesis that there is consumption spreading-consumption does not spike whenever disposable income spikes. We are, however, skeptical of the extreme version of the permanent income or life cycle hypothesis that holds that a rebate would be spread evenly over the remainder of a person's life, in which case its impact on spending in the following year would be virtually zero. Second, they focus primarily on the immediate impact-the impact in the month following the household's receipt of the rebate. They note that there is no spike in consumer spending in the month after the rebate and conclude that the rebate didn't work.
They do not study whether the rebate raised spending gradually over the following year Of course, we can't be sure that consumption outlays would have followed the possible path shown in Figure 2 . Thus, we can't be sure that the rebates raised personal consumption outlays by 39% of the rebates.
Feldstein
In his WSJ article, Aug 6, 2008, Feldstein asserts that he can tell the rebate didn't work simply by examining how actual data changed over time. Outlays, and Personal Saving data at seasonally adjusted annual rates. We divide each number by 4 to get the actual quarterly amount and present this data in Table 2 
Taylor's and Feldstein's AER Regressions
In their AER articles, after a brief review of their own WSJ columns, Taylor and Feldstein each turn to their regression analysis of the BEA data.
Taylor
Column 1 of It is true that this 95% confidence interval includes 0. On the other hand, using the same point estimate and estimated standard error, the interval centered on 0.048 with a lower endpoint of 0 and a higher endpoint of 2 x 0.048 = 0.096, (0.00, +0.096), a 61.4% confidence interval for the true rebate coefficient β.
This means that the probability that β is within this range is 61.4%; the probability that β is below this range is 19.3%, and above this range, 19.3%. 4 Hence, the probability that β > 0 is 80.7%.
Thus, based on the regression results from his sample of data, it is wrong to conclude that the rebate didn't work. There is an 80.7% probability that β > 0. An "insignificant" t value does not mean the rebate had no effect.
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Following Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998, p68) , let t .025 be the t value that leaves 2.5% of the distribution in the upper tail. Then prob(-t .025 < t < +t .025 ) = .95 where t = [(β^ -β)/s β^] and s β^ is the estimated standard error of β^. This implies that prob{[β^ -t .025 (s β^) ] < β < [β^ + t .025 (s β^) ]} = .95. Since Taylor's sample size is 106, with 4 regressors including the constant term there are 102 degrees of freedom (d.f.). Using a t distribution calculator we find that t .025 with d.f. = 102 equals 1.983. Since s β^ = 0.055 and β^ = 0.048, the lower endpoint of the 95% confidence interval centered on 0.048 is 0.048 -1.983 x 0.055 = -0.061 and the higher endpoint is 0.048+ 1.983 x 0.055 = +0.157. 3 We obtain the 61.4% confidence interval as follows. Assuming β^ > 0, we consider the interval (0, 2β^). Consider the generic confidence interval, prob{[β^ -t c (s β^) ] < β < [β^ + t c (s β^) ]} = 1-2c, where c is the area under the t distribution to the right of t c . We solve this expression for t c such that the lower bound of the confidence interval is 0: t c = β^/s β^. Given t c and the degrees of freedom (d.f.), the t-distribution is used to calculate c. In this sample, β^= 0.048 and s β^= 0.055 so t c = 0.048/0.055 = 0.87. Using a t-distribution calculator we find that with d.f. = 102 the probability that t > 0.87 equals 0.193, so c = 0.193. Thus, (0, 0.096) is a 1-2c = 61.4% confidence interval. 4 Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998, p67) write: "Assume, for example, that β^ is .9. If we choose a level of significance of 10 percent, the 90 percent confidence interval for β might be .6 < β < 1.2. This means that the probability that β is within the range .6 to 1.2 is .90." This is the sense in which we use the phrase the probability of β throughout the paper. Stock and Watson (2007, p156) write: "A 95% confidence interval for β…is an interval [before actual numbers are assigned] that has a 95% probability of containing the true value of β."
Column 2 of Table 3 reports our replication of Taylor's regression using his data and sample. Our replication is virtually identical-the numbers in column 2 are virtually the same as column 1. We find that the estimated rebate coefficient is roughly a fourth of the estimated disposable income coefficient and its t statistic is 0.86.
However, in mid 2008, housing prices were falling, home foreclosures were rising, Bear Stearns had been barely rescued in March, and reflecting these events, the index of consumer sentiment was collapsing and the stock market was plunging (recall that Bear Stearns nearly failed in March 2008). Table 4 shows that in June 2008 (as rebate checks were being received), the University of Michigan's consumer sentiment index fell to a low point of 56.4 (in contrast to its January value of 78.4) and the Dow Jones average plunged 1,288 points. All of these downward currents together might have pulled down personal consumption expenditures. Yet Taylor apparently did not try to control for these downward currents.
Inclusion of the consumer sentiment index in column 3 of Table 3 has a dramatic effect on the estimated rebate coefficient. The estimated coefficient nearly doubles so that it is nearly half the value of the estimated disposable income coefficient (0.081 vs 0.182) and its t statistic nearly doubles to 1.36.
The inclusion instead of the change in the Dow Jones average in column 4 has an effect that is similar to the inclusion of the consumer sentiment index: it raises the estimated rebate coefficient and t statistic.
Finally, the inclusion of both the consumer sentiment index and the change in the Dow Jones average in column 5 has a stronger effect on the rebate coefficient than either one alone. The estimated rebate coefficient is now slightly greater than half of the estimated disposable income coefficient (0.099 vs 0.184).
The point estimate of the rebate coefficient is (0.099) and the estimated standard error is (0.060) so a 95% confidence interval centered on 0.099 for the true rebate coefficient β is (-0.020, +0.218).
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It is true that this 95% confidence interval includes 0.
On the other hand, using the same point estimate and estimated standard error, the interval centered on 0.099 with a lower endpoint of 0 and a higher endpoint of 2 x 0.099 5 With 6 regressors including the constant term there are 100 degrees of freedom, and t .025 = 1.984. = 0.198, (0.00, +0.198), is an 89.8% confidence interval for the true rebate coefficient β.
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This means that the probability that β is within this range is 89.8%; the probability that β is below this range is 5.1%, and above this range, 5.1%. Hence, the probability that β > 0 is 94.9%.
In his AER article Taylor also reports results when he includes the price of oil (lagged three months) in his equation. Column 1 of Table 5 reprints the regression results with the price of oil that appear in Taylor's 2009 AER article. Taylor finds that the estimated DPY coefficient is statistically significant with a t value of 3.42 (0.188/0.055= 3.42) and that the estimated rebate coefficient is roughly a half of the estimated disposable income coefficient with a t statistic of 1.50 (0.081/0.054=1.50).
The point estimate of the rebate coefficient is (0.081) and the estimated standard error is (0.054) so a 95% confidence interval centered on 0.081 for the true rebate coefficient β is (-0.026, +0.188).
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On the other hand, using the same point estimate and estimated standard error, the interval centered on 0.081 with a lower endpoint of 0 and a higher endpoint of 2 x 0.081 = 0.162, (0.00, +0.162), is an 86.3% confidence interval for the true rebate coefficient β.
8
This means that the probability that β is within this range is 86.3%; the probability that β is below this range is 6.8%, and above this range, 6.8%. Hence, the probability that β > 0 is 93.2%.
Column 2 of Table 5 reports our replication of Taylor's regression using his data and sample. Our replication is virtually identical-the numbers in column 2 are virtually the same as column 1. We find that the estimated rebate coefficient is roughly a half of the estimated disposable income coefficient and its t statistic is 1.57. 6 We obtain the 89.8% confidence interval the same way we obtained the 61.4% confidence interval above. In this sample, β^= 0.099 and s β^= 0.060 so t c = 0.099/0.060 = 1.65. Using a t-distribution calculator we find that with d.f. = 100 the probability that t > 1.65 equals 0.051 so c = 0.051. Thus, (0, 0.198) is a 1-2c = 89.8% confidence interval.
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With 5 regressors including the constant term there are 101 degrees of freedom, and t .025 = 1.984. 8 We obtain the 86.3% confidence interval the same way we obtained the 61.4% confidence interval above. In this sample, β^= 0.081 and s β^= 0.054 so t c = 0.081/0.054 = 1.5. Using a t-distribution calculator we find that with d.f. = 101 the probability that t > 1.5 equals 0.068 so c = 0.068. Thus, (0, 0.162) is a 1-2c = 86.3% confidence interval. It is true that this 95% confidence interval includes 0.
On the other hand, using the same point estimate and estimated standard error, the interval centered on 0.109 with a lower endpoint of 0 and a higher endpoint of 2 x 0.109 = 0.218, (0.00, +0.218), is an 93.7% confidence interval for the true rebate coefficient β.
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This means that the probability that β is within this range is 93.7%; the probability that β is below this range is 3.2%, and above this range, 3.2%. Hence, the probability that β > 0 is 96.9%.
Testing an Alternative Hypothesis
A plausible alternative hypothesis is that a rebate payment has roughly half the impact of ordinary disposable income on consumption expenditure. Summarizing his empirical results studying the effect of temporary tax changes and transfers on consumption using aggregate time series data, Blinder (1981, p47) writes: "Though the standard error is unavoidably large, the point estimate suggests that a temporary tax change is treated as a 50-50 blend of a normal income tax change and a pure windfall. Over a 1-year planning horizon, a temporary tax change is estimated to 9 With 7 regressors including the constant term there are 99 degrees of freedom, and t .025 = 1.984. 10 We obtain the 93.7% confidence interval the same way we obtained the 61.4% confidence interval above. In this sample, β^= 0.109 and s β^= 0.058 so t c = 0.109/0.058 = 1.88. Using a t-distribution calculator we find that with d.f. = 99 the probability that t > 1.88 equals 0.032 so c = 0.032. Thus, (0, 0.218) is a 1-2c = 93.7% confidence interval.
have only a little more than half as much impact at a permanent change of equal magnitude, and a rebate is estimated to have only about 38 percent as much impact."
We consider the null hypothesis that the true rebate coefficient is half the value of the true disposable income coefficient--equivalently, the rebate coefficient minus half the disposable income coefficient is equal to zero. In the Table 3 We perform a t test of the hypothesis that the rebate coefficient minus half the disposable income coefficient is equal to zero. In column 2 of Table 3 which has Taylor's variables, the point estimate of the rebate coefficient minus half the disposable income coefficient is -0.054 and the estimated standard error of the "difference" is 0.058 so a 95% confidence interval for the true difference is (-0.169, + 0.061) which comfortably includes the value of 0. Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the rebate coefficient equals half the disposable income coefficient-i.e. the difference is 0.
It can be shown that the interval centered on -0.054 (-0.108, 0.00) is a 17.7% confidence interval so that the probability that the true value of the difference is positive is 41.2%.
In column 5, where the regression includes Taylor's variables plus the consumer sentiment index and the change in the Dow Jones average, the point estimate of the rebate coefficient minus half the disposable income coefficient is +0.007 and the estimated standard error of the "difference" is 0.064 so a 95% confidence interval for the true difference is (-0.120, + 0.134) which comfortably includes the value of 0. Once again, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the rebate coefficient equals half the disposable income coefficient-i.e. the difference is 0. It can be shown that the interval centered on +0.007 (0.00, 0.014) is a 45.7% confidence interval so that the probability that the true value of the difference is positive is 72.8%.
We also test the null hypothesis using the regressions in Table 5 where an oil price is included in each equation. In the Again we perform a t test of the hypothesis that the rebate coefficient minus half the disposable income coefficient is equal to zero. In column 2 of Table 5 which has Taylor's variables, the point estimate of the rebate coefficient minus half the disposable income coefficient is -0.009 and the estimated standard error of the "difference" is 0.057 so a 95% confidence interval for the true difference is (-0.122, +0.104) which comfortably includes the value of 0. Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the rebate coefficient equals half the disposable income coefficient-i.e. the difference is 0.
It can be shown that the interval centered on -0.009 (-0.018, 0.00) is a 43.7% confidence interval so that the probability that the true value of the difference is positive is 28.1%%.
In column 5, where the regression includes Taylor's variables plus the consumer sentiment index and the change in the Dow Jones average, the point estimate of the rebate coefficient minus half the disposable income coefficient is +0.019 and the estimated standard error of the "difference" is 0.062 so a 95% confidence interval for the true difference is (-0.104, +0.142) which comfortably includes the value of 0. Once again, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the rebate coefficient equals half the disposable income coefficient-i.e. the difference is 0. It can be shown that the interval centered on +0.019 (0.00, 0.038) is a 38.0% confidence interval so that the probability that the true value of the difference is 69.0%.
Feldstein
In contrast to Taylor who presents his regression results with details in a table, 
Regressions with Quarterly Data
Neither Taylor nor Feldstein report regressions with quarterly data that are commonly used in macro-econometric models. Moreover, quarterly data may be preferable for testing the impact of a rebate on consumption because, as we emphasized earlier, when a household receives a rebate check it usually deposits the check, initially raising its saving, and only gradually raises its spending over the next year, so one month may not be enough time to detect the impact of the rebate on spending. Table 6 presents regression results over Taylor's sample period using the BEA quarterly data that corresponds to Taylor's BEA monthly data. The regressions include the same variables used in the monthly regressions reported in Tables 3 and 5 . In Table   6 , from left to right, columns 1 through 4 report the same regressions as Table 3 where the oil price is omitted, and columns 5 through 8 report the same regressions as Table 5 where the oil price is included. In column 1 of Table 6 the rebate coefficient is 0.170 with a t value of 2.10. By contrast, in column 1 of Table 3 with In this paper we re-examined the BEA aggregate time series data used by Feldstein and Taylor. We found that the aggregate time series data do not show that the rebate failed. In this paper we considered two alternative hypotheses: (1) the Taylor/Feldstein hypothesis that the rebate had little or no effect (2) the hypothesis that the rebate had half the effect on consumption of ordinary disposable income.
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The same calculation gives the lagged effects of ordinary disposable income (DPY) shown in the table. 
